PEG Derivatives Pyrene-PEG-NHS Ester Precautions Sharing

Pyrene-PEG-NHS is one of many polyethylene glycoolenoid derivatives for carbon nanotubes and graphene derivatives, by strongness between the anthracene and the aromatic ring on the single wall and the multi-walled carbon nanotubes. (Close to irreversible) π-π accumulation. The anthracene is bonded to PEG by very stable amide bond. This is a very simple process, only need to disperse carbon nanotubes well with polyethylene glycol-pyrene reagents in an organic solvent or aqueous solution. The same polyethylene glycolite reagent is also applicable to the surface of the carbon nanoparticles that are very matched in graphene or any curvature and the anthracene structure.

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See you in December! Xiaomi 12 Series all-round prediction

Originally, the first batch of Snapdoo flagship new machines usually appear in the spring. However, millet 11 broke this practice a year ago, put the front to the end of the year.

Will you expect Xiaomi 12, will you also release it before the New Year?

the answer is,Probably.

Recently, a digital blogger released a screenshot, the title is "Xiaomi House Sales Guide".

These include the small rice home promotion activities from November 26 to December 25, when starting to cut the price, when selling outbreaks, all arrange it.

But, this is not a focus.

Let us fall on the last date –12.28, key postings live broadcast, new product appointment start.

It is not difficult to guess, Xiaomi 12 will be officially released on December 28, and the appointment can be made after the conference.

As for the credibility of this picture, I think it is quite high.

First, there is a text-numbered watermark on the screenshot, which does have a formal internal file in the field.

Second, the brokerage blogger also emphasized: "Asked,stableof".

It seems that the phone circle is about to start.

If you want you to know the upcoming millet 12 series, what is worth looking forward to.

If you talk nonsense, this will help you organize a wave.

Xiaomi 12 series

On the design, there are now many versions on the network.

There is a camera in the middle.

There is also put the camera on the left.

There is also a camera on the left and add a piece of sub-screen on the right (should be limited to Ultra models).

However, this is not important, what is important is to put on what shots.

Broken news shows that Xiaomi 12 Series will take 50 million pixels.

That is to say, the direction of the previous standard version of the billion-level pixels is changed.

The ULTRA of the main image will be based on the main subject, and it is familiar with the high-quality super wide angle and telephoto.

After a long time, the Leica camera is jointly, and it is finally true.

Positive, Xiaomi 12 Series can basically be determined to be a centered excavation screen, before the subway testing has confirmed us.

Why don’t you use the camera?

With the current technology, the screen camera is indeed a big impact on the display, and the Selfie effect has a great impact.

"I have to", it is really difficult.

For many people interested, the millet 12 series is also useless.

However, the previous generation of evaluations is more embarrassed, the visual inspection has been cut, and the R angle will definitely look smoothly.

In terms of parameters, Xiaomi 12 Series will support LTPO adaptive refresh rate, the resolution will be mainly 2k, and a model will use 1080P.

Don’t see "1080p", I feel that it is not fragrant. I know that this correspondence is 6.2 ~ 6.3-inch small screen models, the majority of netizens are expected.

At present, you cannot confirm the name of this model, or you can call millet 12 mini, and maybe a millet 12 youth, Xiaomi 12X is not impossible.

But compared to the previous generation youth, the stack of this small screen is completely not at a level.

First processor is the most popular Xiaolong 870 this year.

On performance, affirm that the Standard Edition of Xiaolong 8 Gen 1 (temporarily named), but the sacrifice of a little performance under small screen is difficult to heat dissipation, but may not be a bad thing.

And the software optimization of 870 has long been in place, there is no much power consumption and fever anxiety.

On this basis, images, cable fast charge, wireless fast charge, double raise, linear motor, NFC, infrared peripheral configuration, one a lot.

These configurations are added together, at least the small screen flagship should be able to meet the most users who have demand for small screens.

Cough, especially the nail household in Xiaomi 6 is still tempting ~

According to these versions of the previous rhythm, Xiaomi 12 series, it should be released twice, and the small screen and standard version are debuted on December 28.

Although this date, only one day after December 29, Xiaomi 11, but does not mean that Xiaomi can once again grab the first hair of the Snapdong flagship chip.

After all, other manufacturers have long been coveted with this name, and the explosion shows the flagship release of four Snapdragon 8 Gen 1 in December.

You think that the Xiaomi 12 series possessions have been arranged at the end of the month, how big can the first probability?

At present, the old manufacturer Motorola is likely to sit on the first position.

According to the previous official preheating, Motorola will release the Edge X flagship mobile phone in the near future. At present, 3C certification, radio approval, and enter the network license, and the progress is very fast.

Although the Snapdragon 8 Gen 1 has not been released, the general manager of China Mobile’s mobile phone business (note, Motorola mobile phone has been acquired) has been revealed in Weibo. The actual performance of this chip.

For example, "network signal is strong", "a god frame rate line", and "performance ceiling is not unexpected or we", etc.

A bit look forward to the real machine ~

In addition, Motorola EDGE X also has 1080P / 144Hz screen, DC dimming, rear 1 / 1.55 inches, front 60 million pixel lens (you don’t have a mistake, 60 million), etc.

There is no doubt that this is the most important model after Motorola re-established the domestic market. Coupled with the first Snapdragon 8 Gen 1, the attention is certainly not awkward.

Of course, no matter who is released first, optimize in place, the price is appropriate, the stock is enough.

The emergence of Muslim ‘politicophobia’ after 9/11

The term Islamophobia is rather inappropriate to map out the nature of post-9/11 Indian public debates on Muslim identity. Islamophobia, which simply means an intense dislike or fear of Islam or prejudice towards Muslims, is a western notion. It captures the anxieties of the middle-class white population in the US and Europe in the aftermath of the war against terror.

The Muslim identity, on the other hand, is an established problem category in India. The political class, including the so-called secularists, has never been fully comfortable with Muslim presence. The involvement and participation of Muslim communities in political processes is often reduced to an imagined Muslim vote-bank politics, while their social life is always seen as a symbol of backwardness. The events of 9/11 intensified such apprehensions. Popular global phrases like jihadi Islam, Islamic terrorism, sharia rule and so on, offered new meanings to already established debates on Muslim separatism and Muslim isolation.

This interesting merger between global anti-Islamism and anti-Muslim communalism led to a new political consensus, which may be called the “Muslim politicophobia”. Political parties adopted this refined mode to address Indian Muslims in the post-9/11 scenario not merely as a problematic religious minority but also as a part of a global Islamic umma.

Three defining features of Muslim politicophobia are relevant to understand the changing political attitudes towards Indian Muslims in the last two decades.

One, the slow and gradual transformation of the Indian Muslim identity into a reference point for global Islamic terrorism. The Islamic connection between India’s Muslims and the Islamists/jihadi organisations is evoked as the most legitimate template for making sense of violent events associated with Islam and Muslims.

Two completely different statements made by Indian prime ministers in the aftermath of 9/11 are relevant to elaborate this point.

In 2002, Atal Bihari Vajpayee argued stridently that Muslims “want to spread their faith by resorting to terror and threats. The world has become alert to this danger”. Three years later, Manmohan Singh made a very different argument. He took pride “in the fact that, although we have 150 million Muslims in our country as citizens, not one has been found to have joined the ranks of al Qaeda or participated in the activities of Taliban.”

Although these statements offer us two completely opposite conclusions, the manner in which Muslim identity is linked to the global terrorism clearly underlines the fact that Muslim presence in India is seen as an imprint of global Islam.

The recent Afghanistan crisis is a good example of how Muslim politicophobia functions in public discussions. A section of the media has been trying to interpret this crisis by evoking a strange speculative fear. They work hard to find evidence that Indian Muslims subscribe to the ideology of Taliban. There is a popular conception that India (read Hindus) must not rule out the possibility of an internal version of Taliban or an “Indian Taliban” precisely because there is a sizeable Muslim population.

The fear of active Muslim political engagement (or even the lack of it) is the second feature of Muslim politicophobia. The renewed debate on a Muslim vote bank in the last three decades is a good example. Muslims are alleged to vote as a collective in favour of a particular party at the national level. In the post-Babri Masjid scenario, the scope of this argument has been expanded. It is now claimed that Muslims primarily take part in electoral politics to teach a lesson to BJP.

Last year’s Bihar assembly election is an appropriate illustration of this feature of Muslim politicophobia. The Hyderabad-based party, All India Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen (AIMIM), won five Muslim dominated constituencies in the state’s Seemanchal region. The success of AIMIM under the leadership of Asaduddin Owaisi was seen as an Islamic response to BJP’s Hindutva. Even serious secular commentators and non-BJP parties accused Muslim voters of a communal Islamised voting response. No one bothered to look at the political context of Seemanchal region, where caste among Muslims played a significant role in AIMIM’s victory on those five seats. The almost insignificant vote share of the party at the state level (1.24 per cent) was also neglected simply to substantiate the imagined fear of Islamic expansionism in India politics.

The third feature of Muslim politicophobia is related to the popular representation of Muslims as a politically conscious community or what I call siyasi Muslims. It is assumed that Muslims are fully conscious and informed of their collective right and hence always take politically motivated decisions. This perception has found a different overtone in recent years.

The recent Afghanistan crisis is a good example of how Muslim politicophobia functions in public discussions. A section of the media has been trying to interpret this crisis by evoking a strange speculative fear. They work hard to find evidence that Indian Muslims subscribe to the ideology of Taliban. There is a popular conception that India (read Hindus) must not rule out the possibility of an internal version of Taliban or an “Indian Taliban” precisely because there is a sizeable Muslim population.

The fear of active Muslim political engagement (or even the lack of it) is the second feature of Muslim politicophobia. The renewed debate on a Muslim vote bank in the last three decades is a good example. Muslims are alleged to vote as a collective in favour of a particular party at the national level. In the post-Babri Masjid scenario, the scope of this argument has been expanded. It is now claimed that Muslims primarily take part in electoral politics to teach a lesson to BJP.

Last year’s Bihar assembly election is an appropriate illustration of this feature of Muslim politicophobia. The Hyderabad-based party, All India Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen (AIMIM), won five Muslim dominated constituencies in the state’s Seemanchal region. The success of AIMIM under the leadership of Asaduddin Owaisi was seen as an Islamic response to BJP’s Hindutva. Even serious secular commentators and non-BJP parties accused Muslim voters of a communal Islamised voting response. No one bothered to look at the political context of Seemanchal region, where caste among Muslims played a significant role in AIMIM’s victory on those five seats. The almost insignificant vote share of the party at the state level (1.24 per cent) was also neglected simply to substantiate the imagined fear of Islamic expansionism in India politics.

The third feature of Muslim politicophobia is related to the popular representation of Muslims as a politically conscious community or what I call siyasi Muslims. It is assumed that Muslims are fully conscious and informed of their collective right and hence always take politically motivated decisions. This perception has found a different overtone in recent years.

Every aspect of Muslim social life is seen through the prism of global jihadi politics. Muslim population growth is interpreted as “population jihad”, as if Muslim couples plan their families primarily to outnumber Hindus. Muslim personal law is seen as a blueprint for a sharia-based Islamic rule in India. An impression is created that sharia is the only hurdle between egalitarian Hinduism and the modernist ideal of the uniform civil code (UCC). The anti-conversion laws (which are strangely named freedom of religion laws) are also based on this fear that poor and illiterate Hindus are being converted to expand the influence of Islam in India.

It would be completely wrong to reduce Muslim politicophobia to Hindutva politics. Although the BJP has always been a clear beneficiary of this political discourse, the role of non-BJP parties cannot be ignored. These erstwhile secular parties as well as the Muslim political elite were instrumental in creating a conducive environment for Hindutva to appropriate Muslim politicophobia.